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COMMENT
Scientific Databases Should Be Protected
Under a Sui Generis Regime
AMOL PACHNANDAt
INTRODUCTION
The publication of the entire human genome sequence
in February 2001 marked a milestone in scientific achieve-
ment.' However, this remarkable moment was not without
controversy. 2 Celera, the bio-tech company that published
the genome sequence, demanded that anyone wishing to ac-
t J.D. Candidate, SUNY Buffalo Law School, 2003. The author would like to
thank the members of the Buffalo Law Review for their assistance in editing
the drafts of this article.
1. See International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Se-
quencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, NATURE, Feb. 15, 2001, at 860; J.
Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, SCIENCE, Feb. 16,
2001, at 1304.
2. The Human Genome Project (HGP) began in the 1980s following the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) decision to create an ordered set of
DNA segments from known locations to develop new computational methods for
analyzing the genetic map and DNA sequence data. See Darryl R.J. Macer, 5
BIOETHICS 183 (1991).
3. Celera is a company dedicated to the discovery of new therapeutics using
high technology. Celera's website can be accessed at http://www.celera.com (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003). Celera has now embarked on an ambitious project in
protein analysis. See generally, Robert F. Service, Can Celera Do It Again?,
SCIENCE, Mar. 24, 2000, at 2136; Ellen Licking, Beyond the Genome: Biotech's
Next Holy Grail, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 10, 2000, at http://www.
businessweek.com/2000/00_15/b3676117.htm?scriptFramed (last visited Jan.
31, 2003).
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cess its genomic database first sign a licensing agreement
contracting not to re-distribute the seguence to other users.4
This unique agreement disturbed many within the sci-
entific community because science generally functions on
the free and open exchange of published data as a means to
build on pre-existing data, stir debate, cross-check and con-
firm published data. According to Craig Venter, leader of
Celera's sequencing project, the reason for the unusual
licensing agreement was that the United States does not
allow copyright protection for databases.7
A database is a comprehensive collection of information
easily organized to permit search, retrieval and organiza-
tion, and Celera's unique arrangement illustrates the lack
of copyright protection for databases in the United States
today. To understand Celera's decision on a legal level, one
4. The unique agreement between Celera and Science allows academic users
to download up to one megabase of Celera's sequence without restrictions.
However, larger downloads require an agreement whereby redistribution is
prohibited. Similarly, commercial users must sign a Material Transfer
Agreement (MTA) agreeing to not commercialize their finding or redistribute
the sequence. See Eugene Russo, Behind the Sequence: Landmark Human
Genome Papers Represent More Than Major Scientific Achievements, SCIENTIST,
Mar. 5, 2001, at 10. See also Declan Butler, US/UK Statement on Genome Data
Prompts Debate on 'Free Access,' NATURE, Mar. 23, 2000, at 324.
5. "This is the first time in history that a paper reports a scientific result,
but tells readers that to see it, they must sign a contract," says Eric Lander,
director of the Whitehead Center for Genome Research. Russo, supra note 4, at
10. "We have patents, we have copyrights ... but other than that we've never
had a system for preventing people from using basic knowledge." Id. The
publication, Science, also received a lot of criticism from the scientific
community for publishing the sequence on Venter's terms. Science editor
Donald Kennedy said, "It would be better in the best of all possible worlds if
they had put the data in GenBank [the public genomic database].. .But they
couldn't do that because United States copyright protection for databases like
this is just not adequate." Id. at 10.
6. See Tom Paulson, Mapping Human Genome Reaches the End of the Road,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 12, 2001, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.conIlocal/aenol2.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
7. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 N.W. U. L. REV. 77 1999. According to some
industry observers, however, what Venter is doing is "not a commercial venture.
It's really Craig Venter going after the Nobel Prize for sequencing the genome."
Id. at 115. In addition to the issue of copyright protection for databases, there
are also questions regarding patents on human DNA sequences. See, e.g.,
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA
Sequences in the United States and European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623
(2001).
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has to go back to the line of cases that eradicated the pro-
tection of databases. Any discussion about the protection of
databases must belin with Feist Publications v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co. In Feist, the Supreme Court unani-
mously held that copyright protection only encompassed
compilations displaying some degree of "creative original-
ity" in their selection, coordination, and arrangement of
facts, and that investment of money-"sweat of the brow"-
did not, by itself, merit copyright protection.9 The decision
left database compilers, especially those compiling factual
databases, with an extremely "thin" layer of protection."
Generally, creative databases can meet the low thresh-
old requirement of creativity, usually by incorporating the
producer's subjective thoughts. In contrast, factual compi-
lations are most beneficial when they conform to more uni-
form standards and allow end users to manipulate the data
to their own advantage. As such, factual compilations can-
not meet even this low threshold of creativity. Conse-
quently, Celera was reluctant to publish the raw human
genomic sequence," a factual compilation, without restrict-
ing the ability of others to make money by redistributing
the data without incurring the associated costs of produc-
tion and organization.
While Feist and its progeny have threatened database
protection in the United States, the European Union has
decisively addressed this issue. In 1996, the European
Union issued a Directive 2 which conferred sui generis"3
8. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
9. See id. at 359-60 ("Originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of
copyright protection").
10. Id. at 361. For an overview of the traditional forms of intellectual prop-
erty used to provide legal protection for information technology, see Lionel M.
Lavenue, Database Rights and Technical Data Rights: The Expansion of Intel-
lectual Property for the Protection of Databases, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1
(1997).
11. The raw genomic sequence is only the first step towards the develop-
ment of commercially viable products. Researchers still face the long task of
analyzing the raw sequence to determine which parts actually encode for genes,
determine the sequences that regulate transcription, and ultimately determine
the products the genes encode. See Alexander K. Hass, The Wellcome Trust's
Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public Domain & the Potential for
Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145, 146-47
(2001).
12. The text of the Directive is available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/
propertyOO/alternatives/ directive.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
13. Sui Generis means "of its own kind, peculiar." BALLENTINE'S LAW
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
protection to databases for which a substantial investment
of time, effort, or money was put in for their production.
Following the European Union's lead, four separate pieces
of legislation were proposed in the United States with
regards to the creation of a sui generis protection right for
databases.14 The two latest proposals were the Collections
of Information Antipiracy Act and the Consumer and
Investor Access to Information Act of 1999. However,
neither of these bills have received Congressional approval.
This Comment argues that the current state of copy-
right protection for databases in the United States is inade-
quate and must be addressed by Congress. Part I discusses
the current state of protection for databases, and includes
an analysis of the Feist decision and subsequent database
cases. Part II examines the importance of databases in
furthering the scientific endeavor by increasing the accessi-
bility and accuracy of information. Specific attention will
be paid to scientific databases and databases arising out of
the Human Genome Project. Also, attention will be given to
the lack of adequate protection for electronic databases. 5
Part III examines the response of the European Union to
the decision in Feist. Part IV examines the United States'
failed attempts to extend sui generis protection to data-
bases. Finally, Part V examines the inadequacy of state
law alternatives for protecting databases. Ultimately, it
will become clear that the gap created by the Copyright Act
and Feist must be filled by legislative action.
DICTIONARY 1236 (3d ed. 1969).
14. The four proposals, starting in 1996 are: Database Investment and In-
tellectual Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996); Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Collection of Infor-
mation Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); and The Consumer and
Investor Access To Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
15. Recent technological advancements in on-line piracy and increased
availability of electronic databases allow users to duplicate and redistribute
contents of a database with impunity.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF DATABASE PROTECTION
A. The Law Before Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Feist,6
database compilers sought protection for their databases
under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine.17 Under this theory
compilations resulting from a substantial effort were
granted full copyright protection. As a result, future com-
pilers were prohibited from copying facts from the protected
compilations, effectively eliminating the competitive advan-
tage of second-comers. However, the monumental decision
in Feist eliminated the protection afforded to compilers for
their investment and for the time spent collecting informa-
tion and placing it in a useable form. 18
B. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
Rural Telephone Service Company (Rural) published a
typical telephone directory listing the names of its subscrib-
ers in alphabetical order. 9 Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist
Publications), published an area-wide directory that cov-
16. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
17. See Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.
1985). However, the majority of circuits applied the "creative selection" doc-
trine, which only conferred protection to the creative aspects of databases. See
Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987); Southwestern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th
Cir. 1985); Eckes v. Card Price Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); See also Alfred C.
Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copy-
right and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1344 (1991)
(discussing the "creative selection" doctrine); Tracy Lea Meade, Note, Ex-Post
Feist: Applications of a Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245,
250 (1994). See generally Jordan M. Blanke, Vincent Van Gogh, "Sweat of the
Brow," and Database Protection, 39 AM. Bus L.J. 645 (2002).
18. See Paul Goldstein, 38 J. Copy. Soc'y 109, 118 (1991). Despite the im-
pact of the Feist decision, its importance has not been free from question. "I
think everyone is giving way too much importance to Feist. Feist was a unani-
mous Supreme Court opinion, which usually means a lot in constitutional law.
In intellectual property law, it means half of the justices were asleep and didn't
care about the case." Symposium, Database Protection, 11 FORDHAM I.P. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 275, 294 (2001 ) (Comments of Professor Hansen).
19. 499 U.S. at 342.
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ered a much larger geographic area. The larger directory
eliminated the need to consult multiple directories. 2' Feist
Publications agreed to pay each of the eleven local tele-
phone companies for the right to use their listings. 1 Of the
eleven, only Rural declined.22 Regardless, Feist Publica-
tions used Rural's white-page listings without its consent.23
Feist Publications eliminated listings that fell outside
the scope of its directory, hired employees to investigate the
listings that remained, and further verified the data re-
corded by Rural.24 Despite modifications, 1,309 of the 46,878
listings in Feist Publications' directory were identical to the
listings in Rural's white pages."
Rural sued for copyright infringement, taking the posi-
tion that Feist Publications could not use the information in
Rural's white pages to compile its own directory, but must
independently collect the data. 6 Feist Publications' re-
sponse was that conducting its own research would be eco-
nomically unfeasible, wasteful and also unnecessary since
the information in Rural's white pages was not protected by
copyright. 7
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor ad-
dressed the undeniable tension posed by copyright's protec-
tion for compilations, 8 but not facts.29 According to O'Con-
nor, originality, the "sine qua non of copyright,, 3' requires
independent creation by the author plus some minimal de-
gree of creativity.3' The requisite level of creativity is ex-
tremely low and most works "no matter how crude, humble
or obvious," will qualify. 2
20. Id. at 343.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 343-44.
25. Id. Included were false listings Rural had inserted to detect copying. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rural,
holding that the directories were copyrightable. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id.
28. Many compilations contain nothing more than raw data wholly devoid of
any written expression.
29. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Rural's copyright in
the directory extended to the names, telephone numbers, and towns copied by
Feist. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
30. See id. at 345.
31. Id. at 346.
32. Id. at 345.
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O'Connor further pointed out that originality is a con-
stitutional requirement." The originality requirement
mandates the disparate treatment of facts and compila-
tions. Facts are not created and as such, do not owe their
origin to an intellectual conception of an author.34 The dis-
coverer of facts simply finds the information and copies it.
The distinction, according to O'Connor, is that between
creation and discovery.5
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the copyright protec-
tion for compilations is extremely thin.36 Some subjective
input of the author is required to merit copyright protection
for the compilation. However, subsequent users are free to
copy the underlying facts if they select, arrange, or
coordinate the facts in a "creative" way. According to
O'Connor it is not unfair that second-comers may freely use
the fruits of the first compiler's labor without
compensation.37  This is the essence of copyright-to
promote the progress of science and the arts by allowing
others to freely build upon ideas and information contained
in pre-existing works.38
Applying the doctrine to the facts, O'Connor explained
that Feist Publications, by copying the names, towns, and
telephone numbers of Rural's subscribers, took nothing that
was "original" to Rural.39 The raw subscribers' information
were facts discovered by Rural and did not originate from
an intellectual creation.4" According to O'Connor, "'[t]he
originality requirement' rules out protecting... names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of which plaintiff by no
stretch of the imagination could be called author."'" Rural's
33. Id. at 346. The opinion points to two decisions that articulated the idea
that originality is the touchstone of copyright protection. See The Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (the court explained that originality requires inde-
pendent creation plus minimal degree of creativity); Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarnoy, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (copyright is limited to the original intellec-
tual creations of the author).
34. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 349.
37. Id.
38. This theory is known as the idea/expression dichotomy and applies to all
works of authorship.
39. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Patteron & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L.
225
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white pages were "typical," "garden-variety" and entirely
devoid of even the minimal hint of creativity4 2 necessary to
meet copyright's originality requirement.43
The Feist decision established that the protection for
databases, constitutionally and statutorily, was weak. Ac-
cording to O'Connor, courts that permitted protection of da-
tabase under the "sweat of the brow" theory had misinter-
preted the Constitution."
C. The Impact of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.
Feist made it clear that only a compiler's selection and
arrangement of facts would be protected, while the raw
data could be copied at will. With such a "thin,41 layer of
protection, the threat of piracy may discourage the devel-
opment of commercially valuable databases. Database pro-
ducers will be reluctant to spend the time and money neces-
sary to compile a useful database if competitors can copy
and exploit it easily for their own profit.46
Since Feist, courts have analyzed database cases on two
levels.47 First, the court determines if the author's subjec-
REV. 719, 776 (1989).
42. Id. at 362.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 353-54.
45. Id. at 349.
46. W. Matthew Wayman, Comment, International Database Protection: A
Multilateral Treaty Solution to the United States' Database Dilemma, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 427, 435 (1997).
47. "The Feist decision began the slide down a slippery slope of deteriorating
protection for database providers." Russell G. Nelson, Recent Development:
Seeking Refuge From a Technology Storm: The Current Status of Database Pro-
tection Legislation After the Sinking of the Collections of Information Anti-Pi-
racy Act and the Second Circuit Affirmation of Matthew Bender & Co v. West
Publishing Co, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 461 (1999). Subsequent court decisions
have created an analytic structure that can be summarized as follows:
(1) The mere amassing of data, even if with innovative technique, is not
copyrightable; (2) What makes a compilation of data copyrightable is
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those data. Without at
least one of these elements no database will be copyrightable. (3) The
selection or arrangement needed to secure a copyright must not only be
original but also "creative" (4) Selection and arrangement must have
an element of subjectivity they must embody the judgment of the com-
piler. (5) Selection and arrangement can occur at either the macro level
or the micro level; (6) Selection or arrangement will not be protected to
the extent that the resulting database has functional utility (7) selec-
226 [Vol. 51
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tive views were incorporated into the selection and ar-
rangement of the facts. Second, it appears that, regardless
of whether this was the case, courts have held there can
still be no copyright infringement. Two circuit court cases
elucidate how truly thin copyright protection is for factual
databases.
In Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publish-
ing Enterprises, Inc. ,8 the plaintiff sued the defendants for
infringing its copyright in the Chinese-American yellow
pages directory.49 The district court held that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiffs copyright in the directory."
The Second Circuit held that the directory possessed the
requisite originality because the plaintiff had exercised in-
dependent judgment in deciding which information to in-
clude, and the order in which to include it.5 However, since
the defendant's selection and arrangement of the informa-
tion contained in its directory was different than the selec-
tion and arrangement of the plaintiffs directory, there was
no copyright infringement.52 Even though the court held
tion and arrangement at the macro level must be closely scrutinized for
merger of idea and expression [and] (8) infringement of a database will
be judged by comparing the selection or arrangement of the two works,
not the data themselves. Copying of data is not an infringement if the
selection and arrangement in defendant's work are not substantially
similar to the selection and arrangement in plaintiffs work.
Id.
48. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 511.
50. Id. at 511-12
51. Id. at 513.
52. Id. at 515-17. Whether a database receives copyright protection is ulti-
mately dependent of the nature of the facts in the database. In Feist, the facts
(names, telephone number, and addresses of residents in a particular area) ex-
isted in nature. These facts were not comprised of anything original to the
author. By way of contrast, the facts in CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Mac-
Lean Hunter Market Reports, were original to the author because the valuation
of cars was derived from a unique scheme. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). In CCC In-
formation Services, the author, Maclean Hunter, published a book setting forth
the author's projections of the valuations of used cars. Id. at 63. The valuations
represented the author's professional judgment and predictions based on other
information sources. Id. The Circuit Court firmly rejected the lower court's con-
clusion that the used car valuations, like the telephone numbers in Feist, were
pre-existing facts. Id. at 67. The valuations were not reports of historical prices,
numbers which would be pre-existing facts. The valuations were original crea-
tions of Maclean because the number was derived by weighing several factors.
Id. Facts in genomic databases are more closely aligned to the concept of facts
in Feist, and therefore will not merit the greater protection afforded in CCC
228 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
that the database compiler's arrangement and selection was
based on subjective choices, only the arrangement and se-
lection was protected, not the underlying facts."
Perhaps the most disturbing post-Feist case is Warren
Publishing v. Microdos Data Corporation,54 where the Court
held that cable listings were not original enough to deserve
protection. The Warren decision is an example of inequita-
ble decision making. It rewards copying, not creativity.
Warren Publishing was the publisher of a directory which
provided information on cable television systems in the
United States.55 The defendant, Microdos Data Corporation(Microdos), also marketed a computer software package
containing a compilation of facts about cable systems.56
Warren Publishing brought a copyright infringement suit
alleging the Microdos's computer software compilation in-
fringed its cable access directory by copying its selection
and arrangement." On these facts, the district court en-joined Microdos from violating Warren Publishing's copy-
right, holding that the community system utilized by War-
ren Publishing was based on its unique definition of a cable
system and was "sufficient[ly] creative and original to be
Information Services.
In several other cases, the courts held that selections of facts were copy-
rightable. See Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp.
729 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the selection of both street address listings
and out of town destinations in the New York City's taxi drivers guide were
copyrightable); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (court
held that selection of nine categories for use in a baseball pitching form used to
predict the outcome of games demonstrated sufficient originality to merit pro-
tection). Cases in which selection was held not to be creative include Bellsouth
Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the selection of a geographic scope and closing date for a yellow pages
directory was not original); Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, 936 F.2d
671 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a chart containing thirteen months of winning
numbers in New York City's illegal numbers game was not entitled to copyright
protection);.
53. See Key Publ'n, Inc., 945 F.2d at 512. This is in contrast to Feist where
the court held that the selection and arrangement was completely devoid of
originality.
54. 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of that decision, see An-
drew Oram, The Sap and the Syrup of the Information Age: Coping with Data-
base Protection Laws, available at http://www.praxagora.com/andyo/ profes-
sional/collectionlaw.html#footnote 42 (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
55. Warren Publg, 115 F.2d at 1511.
56. Id. at 1512.
57. Id.
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copyrightable."58 The selection of communities utilized by
Microdos was found to be "substantially similar" to that of
Warren Publishing.59
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that Warren's
method of gathering information for its compilation lacked
originality and was excluded from copyright protection.
The Court held that Warren Publishing failed to show that
it had exercised any judgment in "selecting" which cable
systems to include, "but rather included the entire relevant
universe known to it."6 The court further explained that,
even if it were to assume that Warren Publishing's selection
of principal communities was creative and original, it would
still not be entitled to copyright protection "because the se-
lection [was] not its own but rather that of cable opera-
tors."'" Warren Publishing's techniques of contacting the
cable operators to determine which communities were con-
sidered lead communities were "not acts of authorship, but
techniques for the discovery of facts. '6 2 The Court noted
that, "Ulust as the Copyright Act does not protect 'industri-
ous collection,' it affords no shelter to the resourceful, effi-
cient, or creative collector."63 On this basis the Court held
that, though Warren may have found an efficient method of
gathering information, it lacked sufficient creativity and
originality to be entitled to copyright protection.64
Thus, in the cases since Feist, courts have consistently
held that there is a "thin" layer of protection for databases.
Even if creativity and originality is found in the selection
and arrangement of the data, there is nothing to prevent
wholesale copying of the underlying facts. These decisions
clearly demonstrate that copyright protection for databases
is essentially non-existent in the United States.65
58. Id. at 1513.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1518. According to the Court, the only decision it did make was
used to make the directory more commercially useful. Id.
61. Id. at 1519.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1520.
64. Id.
65. See Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning from the Past in the Da-
tabase Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 879, 887 (2001) (proposing that a sui generis
scheme based upon the principles of old copyright cases, coupled with a shorter
period of protection than that is available under copyright law, could provide
the proper balance between access to information and incentive to produce more
information).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF DATABASES IN FURTHERING SCIENCE
A database" is a comprehensive collection of related in-
formation easily organized to permit search, retrieval and
reorganization. Under the 1976 Copyright Act,67 databases
are protected as "compilations." The Act defines a compila-
tion as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting material or of data that are selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. 6 8  A
critical element of this definition is the idea that the un-
derlying material or raw data is not protected.69 It is the
selection, coordination, or arrangement of that data that is
the subject of copyright protection. As such, copyright law
does not prevent a third party from extracting and re-util-
izing the data from a compilation, even if the particular se-
lection and arrangement merits protection.
However, the most useful databases are those that con-
tain comprehensive, organized, and current information. °
To receive even the minimal protection for selection and ar-
rangement of the database, a database producer must cre-
ate a database that is arranged without any logic, and
therefore hard to use in order to receive protection from in-
fringement. 71  This lack of protection is incongruous with
66. Databases are the tools that provide information about information and
have become the new building blocks of knowledge. Michael J. Bastian, Note,
Protection of "Non-creative" Databases: Harmonization of United States, For-
eign, and International Law, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425, 426 n.9 (1999).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
68. Id. For definitions of terms that consistently appear in discussions of
compilations or databases, see Stacey H. King, Are We Ready to Answer the
Question?: Baker v. Selden, The Post Feist Era and Database Protection, 41 J.L.
& TECH 65 (2001).
69. "A striking example of the harm that can result from a grant of proprie-
tary rights in data is the privatization of data from the Landsat series of remote
sensing satellites .... Following privatization, the prices of Landsat data in-
creased from approximately $400 to $4,400 per image." Bastian, supra note 66,
at 431.
70. See John F. Hayden, Recent Development: Copyright Protection of Com-
puter Databases After Feist, 5 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 215, 229-30 (1991).
71. Lisa Barr, Legislative Update: Database Protection Bill, 8 J. ART. & ENT.
L. 371, 376-77 (1998). Database producers have responded to Feist by adding
copyrightable elements to their databases. Consequently, these databases are
more expensive to produce and the information contained in them is not readily
accessible. See Jason R. Boyarski, Note, The Heist of Feist: Protection for Collec-
tions of Information and the Possible Federalization of "Hot News," 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 871, 905-06 (1999). Under Feist, copyright protection is not contingent
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the demonstrated demand and utility of databases.72 Data-
bases are a vital part of virtually every segment of the
economy.73 Though the value of databases to society is high,
so is the cost of producing comprehensive databases. 4
* Their widespread use and critical importance necessitates a
form of legal protection against their misappropriation."
The internet has played a large role in increasing the
accessibility of databases. At the same time, however, it
has increased cost and protection concerns of database
compilers. 6 Database users can quickly migrate from one
database to another and can quickly acquire information.
Once a database is put on-line, the concerns over unau-
thorized access, duplication of content, and mass redistribu-
tion of information produced with large investments of
time, money, and effort, are greatly exacerbated.77 The con-
cern is that second-comers can have access to, and profit
from, purely factual information at no cost.
Scientific databases, usually available online, epitomize
this problem. Few databases will meet the low threshold of
creativity because their utility arises from the fact that they
are exhaustive and standardized."
upon the quality, or usefulness of the compilations, but rather entirely upon the
creativeness of the presentation to the user. See Paul Durdik, Ancient Debate,
New Technology: The European Community Moves to Protect Computer Data-
bases, 12 B. U. INT'L L.J. 153, 176 (1994).
72. For a discussion regarding the general importance of databases see Jef-
frey C. Wolken, Note, Just the Facts, Ma'am. A Case For Uniform Federal Regu-
lation of Information Databases in the New Information Age, 48 SYRACUSE. L.
REV. 1263, 1266 (1998).
73. See Hayden, supra note 70, at 215-16.
74. The primary cost of a database is the high production cost. The produc-
tion cost consists of both data preparation and data collection. The preparation
cost is associated with preparing a database, ensuring data quality, accuracy,
and enhancing the utility of the database for the end user. See A QUESTION OF
BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL DATABASES 44 (1999) [hereinafter A QUESTION OF BALANCE].
75. See id.
76. Digital technology had greatly enhanced a database producer's ability to
compile and disseminate data. It has also enhanced the ability of second comers
to cheaply copy or manipulate the contents and disseminate the information to
other users at a much lower cost. See Bastian, supra note 66, at 429.
77. "Cost recoupment in itself, however, is not a goal of copyright policy un-
less protecting the compilations at issue also promotes the progress [of science]
in some way." Denise R. Polivy, Feist Applied: Imagination Protects, but Perspi-
ration Persists: The Bases for Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 800 (1998).
78. See Durdik, supra note 71, at 169.
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A. Scientific Databases and Factual Compilations in
General
Factual data is the essential building block of scientific
research.79 As the complexity of scientific research contin-
ues to increase exponentially, so does the need for larger
and more comprehensive sets of databases. In the course of
research, scientists frequently draw on existing databases
in order to use information to provide new insights and ad-
vance our understanding of the natural world. This is an
essential part of the scientific process."
Scientific databases present three unique problems and
needs: the need for monetary incentives for commercial
companies to invest in commercializing databases; the need
to provide access to academic users at a low cost to further
scientific research; and the scientific community's need for
full and unrestricted access to data.81
The genomic databases82 have been the voice behind a
new form of protection because of their unique nature. The
genome sequence data differs from other forms of biological
data, because it is the fundamental data that will be used
by scientists for centuries. Therefore, a mode of protection
that will ensure its continued availability and accuracy is
imperative .83
79. See Polivy, supra note 77, at 777.
80. International Council of Scientific Unions, Committee on Date for Sci-
ence and Technology Group on Data and Information, Position Paper on Access
to Databases, available at http://www.codata.org/data-access/wipo.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2003).
81. The later problem inevitably conflicts with "self-help" strategies based
on secrecy or partial disclosure. See Stephen M. Maurer, Raw Knowledge: Pro-
tecting Technical Databases for Science and Industry 1, available at http://www.
sims.berkeley.edu/courses/is296a-3/s99/database.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
82. See generally, Michael Brudno, Protection of Genomic Databases, avail-
able at http://www.stanford.edu/-brudno/essays/genbase.pdf (last visited Feb.
15, 2003).
83. For opinions contending that there should be no right in the human ge-
nome because it is the Common Heritage of Humanity, see Paige Gardner,
Technology and the Environment: Mapping of the Human Genome: Current Ap-
proaches to Sharing the Benefits With Developing Countries, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 281 (2000); J.M. Spectra, The Fruit of the Human Genome
Tree: Cautionary Tales About Technology, Investment, and the Heritage of Hu-
mankind, 23 Loy. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melissa L. Sturges, Note
& Comment, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An Ap-
plication of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219
(1997).
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The next twenty years will bring tremendous techno-
logical innovations, such as cures for diseases, bioinformat-
ics, and improved computer technology. Maybe the most
important innovation in science will lie in the area of con-
tent/information.84 A legislative regime to protect the in-
vestment in information and ensure continued flow of in-
formation is critical.85
B. Databases in the Human Genome Project
In May 1995, an unknown virulent strain of the mi-
crobe that causes tuberculosis infected a twenty-one year
old factory worker. The final tally of infected individuals to-
taled two-hundred and twenty people, including 75% of his
co-workers and 80% of his acquaintances.86
Robert Fleishmann of the Institute for Genomic Re-
search (TIGR), a non-profit genetics research group in
Maryland agreed to sequence the genome of the microbe
and make it available on-line six months later.87 The delay
was not to verify results, but instead to give TIGR's com-
mercial partner, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), an early
look at new discoveries and the time to seek intellectual
property rights.88
This agreement rekindled the debate about who should
control DNA sequence data and how quickly it should be
shared. One group of researchers argued that failure to
share data quickly leads to duplication and waste.89 By way
of contrast, researchers at commercial enterprises opposed
the idea of immediate data release.9" They argued that
immediate release is analogous to asking a pharmaceutical
company to give away its formula for a drug.
84. See Bastian, supra note 66, at 431.
85. Absent reform from Congress, traditional forms of intellectual property
protection are inadequate to protect the investments made by genomics compa-
nies in acquiring genome data. However, protection might be unnecessary be-
cause some companies can still benefit from information in the public domain
by providing access that is easier and more efficient. See Hass, supra note 11, at
162.
86. Eliot Marshall, Ethics in Science: Is Data-Hoarding Slowing the Assault
on Pathogens?, SCIENCE, Feb. 7, 1997, at 777.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. In this instance, TIGR was a facility funded by both public and pri-
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The human genomic sequence is a "natural database,
transforming biological research and applications over the
past decade into a data dependent enterprise."92 The raw
data needed to conduct basic genetic and biotech research is
maintained in nearly two-hundred public sector databases
throughout the world.93 From a computing perspective,
many of these sites tend to be outdated, inaccurate, and
non-standardized.94
The best known of these public databases is GenBank."
However, even GenBank's capabilities are limited. For ex-
ample, the available search tools can only perform full word
searches, while editing and commenting is strictly confined
to the author's annotations. No effort is made to comment
on related journal articles or resolves conflicts. Moreover, it
is virtually impossible to update sequences.96 To exacerbate
the problem, several non-profit biotech databases have been
forced to shut-down.97 Irate researchers have conceded that
the community may have to "get by" with inadequate up-
dating, editing, and annotations."
GenBank is a perfect example of the sometimes low
quality of information in public databases.99 Private data-
bases tend to be more comprehensive because, generally,
they have been repeatedly checked. In a profession where
experiments last months, a crucial mistake can set a team
of researchers back in their quest. °9
vate dollars. Id. However, if public dollars were used to fund the research, then
that information should have been made available as soon as possible. If TIGR
was the only facility that could have decoded the genome then it exercised a
monopoly over public data. This is inapposite to the way science functions.
92. A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 74, at 17-18.
93. Maurer, supra note 81, at 14.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. GenBank provides researchers with tools to hunt for new genes,
compare the evolution of genes in different organisms, and determine functions
of new genes. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Keeping Genome Databases Clean and Up
to Date, SCIENCE, Oct. 15, 1999, at 447.
96. Maurer, supra note 81, at 15.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. David Lipman, director of the National Center for Biotechnology Infor-
mation, admits that NCBI's Genbank has its limitations. "It does not represent
what we know of biology at any given time [because] [iut only represents what
the author put in." Declan Butler & Paul Smaglik, Draft Data Leave Geneticists
With a Mountain Still to Climb, NATURE, Jun. 29, 2000, at 984, 985.
100. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Keeping Genome Databases Clean and Up to
Date, SCIENCE, Oct. 15, 1999, at 447.
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The primary advantage of private databases is that
they are usually well maintained and better annotated. °1
Private database producers require more than the clerical
entry. For example, researchers are required to submit
relevant journal articles, and cross-reference genetic infor-
mation from other organisms that are related to the entry
of sequences. 11 2 Private researchers must also sort through
conflicting data because, at times, researchers use different
terminology to describe the same sequence."°3 By way of
contrast, GenBank often contains entries that appear dif-
ferent but actually refer to the same sequence."'
The rate of scientific progress depends in equal part on
the continued collection of new data, the accuracy of the
data collected, and the dissemination of the information in
the new databases.0 5 This requires both time and money.
The database must be organized with efficient structure,
presentation, and format; provide complementary analyti-
cal support software; and provide optimal quality assur-
ance."' As a database becomes larger and more complex,
database maintenance becomes increasingly important and
constitutes a significant component of the overall cost of the
database. This applies to the human genome project. The
databases that will result from the genomic sequences of
different organisms will extend far beyond just the raw se-
quence data.0
Since the DNA sequence of each organism exists in
nature, the sequencer is merely a discoverer. Without the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, there is no copyright
protection for DNA sequences.' 8 If a researcher constructs
101. Brudno, supra note 82, at 8.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 74, at 26.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Genome related databases are broken down into generalized and spe-
cialized databases. "Generalized databases include the GenBank/EMBL/DDBJ
archives of nucleic acids sequences and the PIR and SwissProt polypeptide se-
quence databases." William M. Gelbart, Databases in Genomic Research,
SCIENCE, Oct. 23, 1998, at 659. These databases are important in presenting in-
formation about molecules without their functional characteristics. By way of
contrast, specialized databases are concentrated around a specific organism or
specific biological function. Id.
108. James G. Silva, Copyright Protection of Biotechnology Works: Into the
Dustbin Of History?, 2000 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 012801 (2000) avail-
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a sequence based on a sequence that exists in nature, but
was undiscovered, then he has not created anything
original."°9 If a researcher then arranges the sequence in a
creative way, the database has lost its utility. While it has
been postulated that a biologist can artistically arrange a
string of nucleotides" ° in a way that does not exist in
nature,"' there is a microscopically slim chance that such
an arrangement could ever code for any protein or have any
use other than as art.1 12 This situation is unlike the phone
directory in Feist, where subjective input and arrangement
might have increased the ease of use and marketability.
Those arguing against the protection of databases must
look to the future. The argument that the scientific com-
munity will be starved for information because everything
that was in the public domain will be taken out is attenu-
ated." '3 After all, it is possible that the new protection for
databases will increase the production of useful databases.
The researchers conducting basic research are not only da-
tabase users but also database producers. If academic labo-
ratories merge their resources and expertise, they can form
comprehensive and useful databases. Naturally, the com-
mercial sector will take notice and infuse money into aca-
demic research."' Academic laboratories could use this
money to replace shrinking government funds, and to pay
for additional research and educational activities."15
Gone are the days where academic labs generated all
able at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/iptf/articles/content/20000
12801.html
109. Id.
110. A nucleotide is "a compound consisting of a nitrogen-containing base
linked to a sugar and a phosphate group. Nucleic acids are long chains of linked
nucleotides, which in DNA contain the purine bases adenine and guanine and
the pyramidines thymine and cystosine." "Nucleotide n." CONCISE MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press 2002).
111. Silva, supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. See Brudno, supra note 82, at 11.
114. "Over time. .. the distinction between "pure" or non-commercialized
data and data applied to industrial pursuits seems likely to break down, as has
routinely occurred in other disciplines... Universities and other research insti-
tutions may view data compilations generated in the course of research as po-
tential revenue sources." J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 68 (1997).
115. "Using data compilations as a source of revenue will be helpful to aca-
demic institutions, "especially in an era of declining government support for re-
search endeavors." Id.
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the basic scientific data. A lack of government funding for
academia has propelled innovative and aggressive compa-
nies to fight for attention. Though the United States has
been slow to respond to the growing need for database leg-
islation, the European Union has enacted a sui generis re-
gime to protect the investment of database compilers in the
production of databases.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION DATABASE DIRECTIVE-A
RESPONSE TO FEIST.
The objective of the sui generis rights is not to promote
the traditional goals of copyright law, but rather to protect
the substantial investment of money and time in the devel-
opment of databases."6 Most countries' copyright laws do
not extend protection to the contents of databases."7 To the
extent that database compilers cannot rely on encryption
and contracts to prevent free riding, the European Union
Database Directive (the "Directive") was implemented to
close the gap in intellectual property law."' This sui generis
regime..9 of property rights is meant to protect database
compilers from free riding by second comers, and is in-
116. See European Union Database Directive, available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/propertyOO/alternatives/directive.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2003). For in-depth analysis of sui generis proposals, see G.M. Hun-
sucker, The European Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an Inter-
national Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697 (1997). See
also Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 114, at 51; Stephen M. Maurer et al.,
Europe's Database Experiment, SCIENCE, Oct. 26, 2001, at 789; Mark Schneider,
The European Union Database Directive, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (1998).
117. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 114, at 72.
118. See id.
119. The following justification for a sui generis regime has been given by
the European Union:
Even the mere accumulation of facts, statistics, bibliographical infor-
mation, names and addresses involves considerable commercial activ-
ity... The data in this instance is similar to a raw material. If others
misappropriate that raw material they will be able to market similar or
identical products or services at greatly reduced costs. In other indus-
tries, it would be considered as an act of unfair competition for the raw
material procured for processing at one company's expense to be freely
appropriated by another company to make a similar product or service.
On the other hand, no one manufacturer should have a monopoly over
the source of the raw material such that he excludes others from the
market for the finished product or service.
Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An International Anti-
dote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215, 1223 (1997).
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tended to protect matters outside the scope of copyright
law.12 °
Under the Directive, databases receive two levels of
protection: "copyright protection for the original expression
and arrangement of facts in the database... and sui generis
protection prohibiting the unfair extraction of a substantial
part of a database reflecting significant investment. " 121 Nei-
ther right extends copyright protection to the underlying
facts and data. 22 The European proposal required a "sub-
stantial investment in the compiling, verification, or pres-
entation of information" for a database to be protected.
123
Creativity is not a prerequisite for protection under the new
scheme." If the database meets the "substantial invest-
ment" threshold, the database producers obtain the right to
prevent extraction and re-utilization of the whole or a sub-
stantial part of the contents of the database. 125 The Direc-
tive allows users to extract or re-utilize "insubstantial
parts" of the database so long as they do not harm the in-
terests of the database producer.'26 "These new rights are
granted on a reciprocal basis, which means that only
authors from countries which grant similar rights to Euro-
pean databases are entitled to claim these rights in
Europe."'27
Commentators have argued that the Directive breaks
away from the historical limits of intellectual property pro-
tection in at least three ways. First, it grants an exclusive
property right based on the extent of investment without a
requirement of creative contribution to the public domain.
Second, it grants an exclusive property right in information
120. According to Powell, the European Union realized that copyright law
alone would not provide the adequate level of protection for the substantial in-
vestments in purely factual databases. Id. at 1220.
121. Jonathan Band & Jonathan S. Gowdy, Sui Generis Database Protec-
tion: Has Its Time Come?, D. LIB. MAG., June 1997, available at
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june97/06band.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
122. Hunsucker, supra note 116, at 741.
123. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law and Sui Generis Pro-
tection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN L. REV. 151,
171 (1997).
124. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 114, at 54-5.
125. See Hunsucker, supra note 116, at 723-24; Reichman & Samuelson, su-
pra note 114, at 55.
126. See id. at 90-1.
127. Cynthia M. Bott, Protection of Information Products: Balancing Com-
mercial Reality and the Public Domain, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 237, 261 (1998).
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that was previously considered an unprotectible raw mate-
rial; and finally, it grants a perpetual right to the database
owner as long as he continues to make a substantial in-
vestment in the database.'28
These concerns must be mitigated by the incredibly
rapid pace of change in electronic databases, which increase
the rate of copying and re-distribution. As technology
evolves, so must outdated methods of protection. It seems
unfair that producers of factual compilations are left with-
out protection for their investments simply because their
business is in "facts." The Directive's two tiered approach
effectively responds to this concern. The approach differen-
tiates between compilations that truly are the result of
original authorship and worthy of full copyright protection,
and compilations that are not original but still worthy of
protection because they are based on a large investment of
labor and effort. Because this sui generis right is carefully
balanced with appropriate fair use exemptions and restric-
tion on duration, the public domain will be enriched by
compilations of more useful databases rather than con-
densed because of information hoarding.
IV. LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The database industry is part of a global information
marketplace where development outside of the United
States can have a marked effect on the ability of United
States information providers to competitively operate in-
ternationally.29 Databases are most valuable when they are
128. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Promoting Public Good Uses of Scien-
tific Data: A Contractually Reconstructed Commons for Science and Innovation,
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/ ReichmanandUhlir.pdf. Com-
mentators have argued that the European Directive is "one of the least bal-
anced and most potentially anti-competitive intellectual property regimes ever
created [and] will stiffly access to information, retard competition in the data-
base industry, and impede basic scientific research." Hunsucker, supra note
116, at 706.
129. One commentator warns that the U.S. should not leap off the bridge
like the E.U. It may turn out that American database producers can still com-
pete with Europe. Additionally, trade sanctions can be imposed to deter the ill-
effects of E.U. legislation on United States databases. See Maurer et al., supra
note 116, at 789. However, the idea of sanctions against Europe is impractical.
It would have a chilling effect on the advancement of research and harm the
public in the long run. See also, Remarks of Q. Todd Dickinson, Under Secre-
tary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of U.S. PTO, available
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comprehensive in their field of application, reliable, up-to-
date, and logically organized. And these attributes can only
be obtained through great labor and expense. But these are
exactly the kinds of databases that are at risk because of
the Feist decision. Feist and its progeny "reward artistic
creativity, but not scientific utility.1
3 °
Federal copyright and state contract law still remain
essential tools for protecting the large investments in data-
bases. However, "there are clearly gaps that can be filled
only by legislation for federal database protection.""13 Pro-
tection for non-creative database is necessary for three rea-
sons: to establish an incentive for commercial producers to
compile databases; to ensure accuracy and quality of the
data; and to protect United States economic interests in a
global information economy.
3 2
The goal of Federal copyright legislation in the United
States should be to reach a balance between providing in-
centives to private creators and maintaining sufficient pub-
lic access to factual works. 13 The amount of work required
to maintain, update, and verify databases is increasing ex-
ponentially and maximizing public resources.' However
the increased work is not matched by increased funding.",
Federal government funding for scientific research is en-
tirely limited by outdated budgets and numerous competing
priorities and allocations. The possibility of government
funding is significantly less likely considering the events of
at http:l! www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/bulletin/cardozo.pdf "I believe
we need to move forward domestically ... to ensure that the global intellectual
property community does not move ahead without us." Id.
130. Statement of Dr. Robert Ledley before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, Oct. 23, 1997, available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41122.htm
131. Position Paper, Harvard Information Infrastructure Project, Advisory
Committee on International Communications and Information Policy, available
at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/iip/acicip/IIA.HTM (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
132. Michael Freno, Database Protection: Resolving the United States Data-
base Dilemma With an Eye Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 165, 185 (2001). Freno's paper also provides a history of database protec-
tion in the United States. Id. at 168.
133. But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Ac-
cess Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 489 (1996) (Professor Lunney contends
that the incentives-access paradigm is fundamentally flawed. He identifies allo-
cative efficiency, rather than the incentives-access balance, as the appropriate
guide for determining the proper scope of copyright protection).
134. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 114, at 145.
135. Id.
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September 11 and the resulting War on Terrorism. Inevi-
tably, public funds must be supplemented by private funds.
However, "[w]ithout protection sufficient to justify
investment in development and maintenance of updated
collections, such investments will simply not be made; or
will be made not by publishers of the information, but by
those who would gain competitive advantage by keeping it
to themselves.,
136
Some commentators have pointed out that after Feist,
the growth rate of both databases and database producers
dampened considerably in the following years.137 This
dampening demonstrates the increased need for sui generis
protection rights. There are three main justification for
this need: "Collections made through a substantial invest-
ment deserve protection from copying, [t]echnological
change facilitates free-loading... [and] [n]ew rights for col-
lection makers will improve their markets and rates of re-
turn.0
38
To address the recent legal developments, like the Di-
rective, and technological developments, like electronic da-
tabases, intellectual property protection in the United
States will have to be expanded."9 If not, many of the
American database industry's most valuable products face
the grave prospect of being stolen and marketed as com-
peting products. 4 ' Going beyond the traditional legal no-
tions of protecting property rights, the United States has a
concrete reason to enact legislation providing sui generis
protection. This is because of the reciprocity requirement
in the Directive. Unless the United States enacts comple-
mentary legislation, European companies can continue to
extract valuable data from American databases while re-
maining protected from similar exploitation by American
136. See Statement of Dr. Robert Ledley, supra note 130.
137. See Freno, supra note 132, at 186.
138. Oram, supra note 54.
139. However, the expansion of intellectual property protection is not with-
out its critics. See Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property
Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 233
(1998); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads:
Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 812-13 (1999).
140. A previous attempt to enact domestic legislation was met with opposi-
tion from the scientific and engineering communities. See W. Gardner & J. Ro-
senbaum, Database Protection and Access to Information, SCIENCE, Aug. 7,
1998, at 786.
241
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
database companies. 14 This places American companies at
a competitive disadvantage. In the growing electronic uni-
verse there is a greater need for a level playing field.142
The present success of the database industry nationally
is an incorrect measuring stick for the industry's health at
the international level.14  Only a comparison between the
United States and countries that protect their database
through legislation could alleviate worries at the interna-
tional level and demonstrate whether the United States is
or is not lagging in production of useful databases.'44
Further, the argument that the sui generis right will
deplete the public domain and retard the creativity and
growth of science is misconceived.145 The added protection
will not cause the demise of science because there are coun-
ter-balancing legal doctrines. Every proposal for added pro-
tection includes numerous exceptions that protect research-
ers and the public in certain contexts. Moreover, antitrust
law can be used to address these and other problems.'
A. The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act
The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (the An-
tipiracy Act)147 was intended to "eliminat[e] the inequity in a
legal regime that allows an unscrupulous competitor to copy
with impunity the contents of someone else's compilation
and then destroy the first compiler's market by selling a
competing, less expensive product.',4  Opponents of data-
base legislation'49 argued that the Antipiracy Act interfered
141. See Freno, supra note 132, at 189.
142. See generally Jack E. Brown, Proposed International Protection of Elec-
tronic Databases, 27 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 17 (1996).
143. Freno, supra note 132, at 189. See also Paula Baron, Back to the Fu-
ture: Learning from the Past in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 879, 887
(2001) (Professor Baron proposes that a sui generis scheme based upon the prin-
ciples of these cases, coupled with a shorter period of protection than that is
available under copyright law, could provide the proper balance between access
and incentive).
144. Freno supra note 132, at 189.
145. Id. at 190.
146. Id. at 191. See generally, A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 74, at 8.
147. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). For a discussion of the Antipiracy Act,
see Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the
106th Congress, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 869 (2001).
148. Aaron Karnell, The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Creating
an Intellectual Property Right in Facts, 28 S .U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
149. Tussey, supra note 139, at 213-14.
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with legitimate scientific research and reduced the amount
of information available in the public domain.15°
Under the Antipiracy Act, a database was considered a
"collection of information," and was defined as "information
that has been collected and has been organized for the pur-
pose of bringing discrete items of information together in
one place or through one source so that persons may access
them."1 '1 Similar to the Directive, the Antipiracy Act pro-
hibited a second-comer from extracting or utilizing a sub-
stantial part of the database if it would harm the actual or
potential market of the primary user.15 Whether a sub-
stantial part of the database has been taken depends on ei-
ther a quantitative or qualitative analysis. The Directive,
by way of contrast, only prohibits qualitative misappropria-
tion. This analysis can be reduced to read that if the infor-
mation is central to the databases worth, its extraction or
reutilization is prohibited. This section essentially re-in-
troduced the "sweat of the brow theory" because it protects
investments of substantial monetary or other resources."'
Any substantial investment would have been protected, re-
gardless of whether it is money, time, or effort.
In addition, the Antipiracy Act, like the Directive, con-
tained fair use exemptions to misappropriation similar to
those enunciated in the Copyright Act of 1976."' For exam-
ple, under the Antipiracy Act, non-profit, educational and
scientific users would be able to extract or re-utilize data to
the extent that their use did not harm the actual market of
the product.1 Section 1402, when read in conjunction with
section 1403, would have extended the Antipiracy Act's pro-
150. See J. Ryan Mitchell, If at Feist You Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again: An
Evaluation of the Proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 900, 916 (1999); Nelson, supra note 47, at 464.
151. H.R. 354 §1401 (1).
152. Id. at §1402.
153. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 911.
154. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §107 (1976). Four factors in consider-
ing whether a particular use is a fair use are:
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the na-
ture of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. Id.
155. H.R. 354 §1403(a)(1).
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tection to a producer's potential market as well.'56 To keep
from being too rigid, an exemption was carved out for "rea-
sonable uses," provided that there was no direct harm to
the producer's actual market.'57 As a result, in the genomics
context, an academic researcher could not use a producer's
database, make a discovery, and then sell that discovery to
the original producer's competitor or compete with the
original producer.5 8
Though some might argue to the contrary, sui generis
rights will not take facts out of the public domain.' The
Antipiracy Act contained a provision that would have al-
lowed the extraction and re-utilization of insubstantial
parts of a database or individual items of information.'6 °
Second users were not prohibited from independently gath-
ering the same information through investment of substan-
tial monetary or other resources. Protection under the An-
tipiracy Act was independent of copyright law and
preempted state law remedies. 6 ' Though the debate which
surrounded the Antipiracy Act continues today, the act it-
self is no longer a viable legislative option.'62
B. The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of
1999
The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act
of 1999 (the Act of 1999)163 defines a database as a "collec-
tion of discrete items of information that have been col-
lected and organized in a single place, or in such a way as to
be accessible thorough a single source. ' 64 The organization
156. Id. at §1402(a).
157. Id. at §1403(a)(1).
158. See generally id. at § 1403.
159. Id. at §1403 (c).
160. Id. at §1403 (b).
161. Id. at §1405(b), §1405(c). H.R. 354 also included a provision to federal-
ize the "hot news" doctrine. See Boyarski, supra note 71, at 912 (1999). The "hot
news" state misappropriation doctrine allows companies in media related
industries to prevent their competitors from stealing time sensitive information
such as current news items. Id. at 876. Boyarski contends that this provision
gives much broader protection than the state misappropriation doctrine and
therefore should not be adopted. Id. at 923.
162. See Blanke, supra note 17, at 680.
163. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). See generally Band & Kono, supra note
147, at 873.
164. H.R. 1858 §101.
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and collection must have required an investment of sub-
stantial monetary or other resources. 165 Similar to the An-
tipiracy Act, the Act of 1999 re-introduces the sweat of the
brow doctrine.
Despite certain similarities, the Act of 1999 severely
limits the rights of database producers against information
pirates. For example, it only prohibits the distribution of
duplicate databases in competition with the first data-
base.166 The distinction here places the task of determining
the meaning of "duplicate" to the judiciary. Duplicate could
mean 100% copying, or a "substantial similarity" in copy-
ing.16
7
The Act of 1999, like legislation preceding it, contains a
fair use provision for scientific, research, or educational168 t
uses. This time, however, the teeth have been pulled.
The current legislation requires that liability will only occur
if there is a consistent pattern of misappropriating the da-
tabase for the purpose of direct commercial competition.
The "consistent pattern" standard may be too arbitrary
since harm to the primary database producer's market
could be accomplished by one act of misappropriation. De-
spite this, a cause of action would only arise for the data-
base producer if the person benefiting from the protection
afforded under section 102 misused the protection. 
69
Two congressional terms have elapsed without a serious
database protection bill. The introduction of a viable bill
merits strong consideration. The Act of 1999 was a re-
sponse to the criticism surrounding the harshness of the
Antipiracy Act. However, the Act of 1999, in its present
form, was not a serious bill for the protection of databases
because it preempted all state law, and required a showing
of duplication of the first database to establish infringe-
ment. 1 7  It seems that the United States legislature is
165. Id.
166. Id. at §102.
167. The phrase "substantial similarity" is derived from copyright cases in-
volving computer programs and infringement. See Computer Assoc Int'l, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Computer Assoc. Int'l v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
168. H.R. 1858 §103(d).
169. See H.R. 1858 §102, §106.
170. H.R. 1858, "which is purportedly there to protect databases, really
would dramatically reduce the protection we have for databases even today,
without the bill." Symposium, supra note 18, at 278. Hansen also comments
that the technical industry is generally contributing to the Republicans. Id. at
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waiting for the European experiment to produce concrete
results before stepping into the batter's box. Unfortunately,
the time to act is now, and not when the ball has cleared
the fence, leaving United States database producers and
users facing an insurmountable deficit.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO A SuI GENERIS MODEL
Several commentators contend that, even in the ab-
sence of legislative protection, database publishers have al-
ternative means of protection171 through state misappro-
priation or contract law, and through technological self help
measures such as encryption.1
2
The biggest flaw in using state law doctrines is the lack
of national uniformity. Local protection is inadequate in
light of the fact that databases are internationally accessi-
ble and marketable. 3 Furthermore, misappropriation doc-
trine is more useful in scenarios where the information is
time-sensitive. 4 Human genome databases do not qualify
because the sequences are fundamental information that
will remain unchanged.
A. State Contract Law
State contract law is an efficient method of creating
rights between two parties. Under the terms of the con-
tract, database producers can customize the features of a
database to the particular needs of users. Although con-
tract law creates private rights on one hand, it lacks suffi-
ciency and uniformity. The terms of the contract are only
enforceable against a party to the contract.' Thus, once a
party to the contract distributed the software to another
party, the third party is not bound by the contract terms
299. Since both Houses are Republican, time for the legislation to pass has ar-
rived.
171. Professor Ginsburg advocates a compulsory licensing scheme to strike a
balance between the rights of database producers and users. See Jane C. Gins-
burg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Infor-
mation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990)
172. See Terry M. Sanks, Comment, Database Protection: National and In-
ternational Attempts to Provide Legal Protection for Databases, 25 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 991 (1998).
173. See Barr, supra note 71, at 388-89.
174. Id.
175. See Barr, supra note 71, at 389.
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because there was no privity of contract between the
database producer and a third-party. This element of the
"meeting of the minds" in not a requisite in copyright law.176
State contract law is not the appropriate method for in-
creasing the grant of rights for database producers because
it lack uniformity. This leaves open the possibility of con-
flicting results concerning the same database. Also, in an
international, internet driven economy, the strength of a
federal law is necessary to buttress the needs of database
producers throughout the world.
A final shortcoming of state contract law is that it does
not encompass the fair use provisions of copyright law.177
Without the fair use provisions, educational institutions are
at a disadvantage. The balance of rights is skewed. Data-
base producers will not want to put their databases in an
electronic format. Consequently, academic users will not
have access to information for educational purposes.
State contract law is insufficient to meet the needs of
database producers in an electronic economy. At a mini-
mum, the protections of copyright law and a sui generis re-
gime are required to ensure the continued production and
distribution of databases.
B. State Misappropriation Doctrine
Under "state misappropriation doctrine,' 71 the court
examines the methods which result in an unfair competitive
advantage. These methods must consequently be prohib-
ited.179  This is measured by a balance of factors such as
comparative costs, the value added, and the availability of
similar copying or reverse engineering methods for other
technologies."'
176. Similarly, state contract law does not preempt copyright law because
copyright law does not share the bargained for exchange requirement. This ex-
tra element is not required to prove copyright infringement, therefore there is
no preemption.
177. See
178. Professor Robert A. Gorman concluded that, in light of Feist and the
preemption doctrine incorporated in section 301 of the Copyright Act, the Copy-
right Act preempts the state tort of misappropriation of facts and compilations.
See Brown, supra note 142, at 24-25.
179. See generally Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellec-
tual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2594 (1994).
180. Dennis S. Karjala, Policy Considerations: Theoretical Foundations for
the Protection of Computer Programs in Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
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The doctrine of state misappropriation also varies from
state to state. Most recently, the Second Circuit, in Na-
tional Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.,18 ' enunciated
a two-part test under New York's misappropriation doc-
trine. First, the Court looked to specific instances where
the plaintiff generates highly time-sensitive information at
some cost and defendant free-rides on plaintiffs efforts.
Second, the Court considered whether the defendant com-
petes directly with the plaintiff and whether defendants' ac-
tions would so reduce plaintiffs incentive to produce the
service such that its existence or quality would be threat-
ened. l"2
In some respects, state unfair competition law is inap-
propriate to address the lack of protection for the invest-
ment of effort in databases. To begin with, it is impractical
to harmonize database protection schemes that exist in dif-
ferent forms in each state."3 Secondly, the purpose of un-
fair competition law is to regulate the conduct of direct
competitors, but not suppliers and users."' A legislative re-
gime that "determines the acts to be performed without
authorization by all users, whether or not they are competi-
tors, is more desirable."'85
Compilations of genetic information are unlikely to
meet the tests for protection under state misappropriation
law. Under the Motorola test, genomic publishers would
not be able to show that their incentives are so severely re-
duced by copying as to threaten the business. Generally
their profits are high and some mix of technological and
contractual methods can be used to limit access to their in-
formation.
CONCLUSION
In the short term, protecting database makers from
free-riders is the main priority because free-riding presents
the greatest threat to the economic interests of database
makers in the United States."8 However, it is important to
BASIN L.J. 179, 188 (1994).
181. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997)
182. Id. at 845.
183. Powell, supra note 119, at 1224.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1250.
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realize that any regime for protecting databases must also
be mindful of the future. For example, bioinformatics is a
burgeoning area without specific metes and bounds. A deli-
cate balance of promoting open access to data and incen-
tives to produce data must be achieved. The pace of genetic
research is largely dependent on the existence of compre-
hensive, and accurate databases. Unless private biotech
companies are given an incentive to create databases we
might not be far from imagining a slow crawl towards dis-
covery and progress.
Factual compilations, such as databases, pose a par-
ticularly difficult problem for protection because their na-
ture makes them difficult to adequately protect in the elec-
tronic age under the copyright law. Furthermore,
creatively selecting data can exclude desirable information,
while creatively arranging data may frustrate users.
187
Legal scholars who continue to voice disapproval of da-
tabases based on the possible threat to social policy and the
perceived risk of the removal of information from the public
domain are misguided.'88 Their views are based on the false
theory that intellectual property laws extend sweeping pro-
tection to the owners of patents, copyrights, and data-
bases.8 9 This is not true. Patents only protect specific in-
ventions, not ideas. Copyrights only protect specific works,
not types of literature or art.90 Database rights would only
protect specific data compilations, not raw factual informa-
tion. These laws do not prevent someone from making the
same compilation of data independent of the former work.
Database legislation is a matter of striking a balance.
Researchers have to be encouraged to put data into the
public domain rather than hoarding it as confidential in-
formation. 9 ' The interest of the scientific community at
large also has to be considered. The grant of rights should
be broad enough to promote investments in, rather than the
stifling of research. 2 Database companies spend hundreds
187. See Hunsucker, supra note 116, at 716.
188. Polivy, supra note 77, at 777-78. Furthermore, the First Amendment
and fair use exemptions adequately protect public rights. Id. at 778.
189. See Lavenue, supra note 10, at 36.
190. Id. at 58
191. Tim Powell, Patenting the Human Genome, available at
http://www.eyeforpharma.com/index.asp?news=15978 (last visited Feb. 26,
2003).
192. Id.
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of millions of dollars to collect, organize, verify, maintain
and update huge databases. They also develop the best
means to distribute reliable data to their customers quickly
and efficiently, whether via the internet, in CD-ROMs or
other formats.3
Currently, the copyright law does not protect the huge
investments of time and money involved in database pro-
duction and leaves the contents of these databases vulner-
able to pirates. Copyright law does not adequately protect
the investment of the producers. Federal legislation must
be enacted to protect the investment of database compilers
and to ensure that they remain a valuable and reliable re-
source for millions of users."'
193. See Coalition Against Database Piracy, Separate the Facts from Fiction:
The Truth About Database Protection Legislation, available at
http://www.cadp.net/legislationlegislationfacts.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
194. See id.
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